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Users of password-protected systems have to be persuaded 
to follow certain regulations to keep systems secure. This 
paper describes the results of a first study of the mental 
models, metaphors, attitudes and skills users hold with 
respect to password mechanisms. It shows that users are 
currently not motivated to adopt proper password 
practices. They do not believe that they ultimately can stop 
somebody from getting into the system, or that somebody 
getting in could cause them any serious personal harm. We 
recommend a novel approach to the design of training and 
online support, which is based on an appropriate use of 
fear appeals.  
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In the past, research on computer security mechanisms has 
focused almost entirely on technical issues. In recent years, 
there has been an attitude shift in the computer security 
community. Humans are now generally considered to be 
the weakest link in the security chain [1,2], and 
practitioners in the field look to HCI as a provider of 
usable solutions.  
[3] makes clear that security mechanisms need a usability 
standard that is different and ultimately more stringent 
than that applied to most other forms of software. 
However, making systems secure requires more than just 
improved user interfaces. Users need to be better educated 
about security issues. At the moment, they construct their 
own, often wildly inaccurate model of possible security 
threats and the importance of security [2]. This, in turn, 
leads to behaviour that strongly undermines the security of 
the systems in question: users choose passwords that are 
cryptographically weak, write them down and store them 
in insecure locations and easily disclose their passwords to 






for this kind of behaviour, but are hardly ever enforced. 
Hackers easily exploit insecure password practices, in 
particular those skilled in social engineering [1]. 
Even if the usability of password mechanisms improves in 
the future, and users become better educated in their use, 
there is still one further point that needs to be addressed. 
For most users, security is an enabling task that creates 
additional overheads. This means that users need to be 
motivated to make the additional effort to use passwords in 
a manner that maximises the overall security of the system 
in question. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
The aim of our research is to develop means of persuading 
users to adopt proper password behaviour. Our overall 
approach can be outlined in three steps: 
1. We look at five factors influencing users’ behaviour: 
their mental models, metaphors, attitudes and social 
and technical skills. In order to elicit these from a 
specific user group, we conduct interviews which are 
then analysed using the method of discourse analysis 
as proposed by Potter and Wetherell [4] (see [5] for a 
related use of discourse analysis in HCI). 
2. We identify those mental models, metaphors, attitudes 
and skills that lead to proper password behaviour. 
3. Finally, we look at ways of guiding users into 
adopting the elements discovered in step 2. In order to 
do this, we undertake changes to the discourse about 
security mechanisms, especially in tutorials and 
training; the password mechanism itself; and the 
security policy for the system. 
STUDY 
We carried out 17 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
comprising questions concerning various aspects of 
password security. Ten of the participants worked for a 
technology company, 6 were Ph.D. students, and 1 was a 
systems administrator working in finance. The interviews 
lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and were subsequently 
transcribed and analyzed using discourse analysis. 
Study results 
The following is a list of the most important factors 
influencing security behaviour that we have identified: 
• Identity issues: Participants exhibiting good password 
behaviour are often described as ‘paranoid’ – even by 
themselves. Some participants are proud that they do 
not understand security (‘I’m not a nerd’) or do not 
comply to regulations (‘I don’t just follow orders’). 
• Social issues: Sharing your password is regarded by 
many participants as a gesture of ‘trust’ in their social 
interactions – you share your password with people 
you trust, and somebody refusing to share their 
password with you is effectively telling you that they 
don’t trust you. 
•  ‘Nobody will target me’: Most participants regard the 
information on their system as not important enough 
to become the target of a hacker or industrial spy. 
Hackers, for example, are assumed to target ‘rich and 
famous’ people or institutions. 
• ‘They could not do much damage anyway’: Most 
participants do not think that somebody getting into 
their account could cause any serious harm. 
• Accountability: Most participants are aware of the fact 
that their behaviour does not fully comply with 
security regulations. However, they do not expect to be 
made accountable for this, since they regard the 
regulations as unrealistic and their behaviour as 
common practice. In addition, they know that there 
always is a chance that a hacker will break into their 
system, however well they behave. They can always 
claim that it was not their misbehavior that led to the 
break-in. However, a few participants realize that they 
might be made accountable for improper behaviour in 
the past (e.g. writing down their password), if 
somebody gets into their system now. 
• Good behaviour without a reason: There are a number 
of participants who make the attempt to exhibit good 
password behaviour despite the fact that they are of 
the opinion that this is not strictly necessary or 
justified. They follow regulations because they 
perceive it as necessary in order to maintain their 
professional reputation, or because they believe that 
any security failure involving their employer would 
ultimately reduce the standing of the employer in the 
business world. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a number of recommendations that can be made 
from the data we have collected and analyzed. Here, we 
focus on the proper use of fear appeals to motivate users to 
behave in an adequate fashion. This is also the subject of a 
field trial we are currently carrying out. 
Roger’s protection motivation theory [6] states that fear 
appeals will be successful when they convince a person 
that (1) the problem is serious and may affect the person; 
(2) it can be avoided by taking appropriate action; (3) the 
person is capable of performing the necessary behaviour 
required to avoid the problem.  
The results of our study show that some or all of these 
points are not fulfilled for a large number of participants. 
They do not think it is likely they will be targeted, and if 
they are, they do not expect any serious damage to be 
caused. In addition, they believe that even if they behaved 
properly, a determined hacker could still get in. Finally, 
they know that their employers can not monitor their every 
action, so bad password behaviour will usually go 
unnoticed. They can also always claim that it was not their 
misbehaviour that let the hacker into the system. This 
means that for a fear appeal to work, a lot of organizations 
would be recommended to undertake a number of changes 
to existing policies and the current discourse about 
password security in training and online support: 
• Do not present the problem as one of a hacker getting 
into an account and doing serious damage. 
• Instead, present it as one of the organization’s 
reputation being tarnished if it were to be known to 
the outside world that its employees behaved in a 
fashion that was not security-conscious. This gives the 
fear appeal (and the associated punishment) a rational 
motivation which will raise users’ acceptance of it. 
• Appropriately punish behaviour, not its consequences. 
In other words, make it clear that you can not monitor 
all the employees all the time, but that you will make 
detailed enquiries about their past behaviour in case of 
a break-in through their account. This behaviour will 
definitely be punished, whether it led to the actual 
break-in or not. 
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